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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Natu re Of The Case 
William Fifer appeals from the district court's order affirming the judgment 
entered by the magistrate upon Fifer's guilty plea to driving under the influence. 
Fifer claims error in the denial of his suppression motion. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
A concerned citizen called 911 after encountering an elderly motorist who 
looked like his car was stalled. (Exhibit, Track 1.) The caller, who identified 
herself as Becky, told dispatch that the driver was an elderly man who may have 
been intoxicated but was, in any event, quite confused and possibly "having 
symptoms of a stroke or something." (Id.) Becky offered the driver assistance 
but he declined, stating he just did not feel like driving. (Id.) After Becky offered 
to help, the driver proceeded to a nearby Walgreens and parked his car at which 
time Becky called 911. (Id.) Becky provided dispatch with a description of the 
car (a blue Camaro), a partial license plate, and the location of the Camaro. (Id.) 
Becky also provided dispatch with a phone number where she could be reached. 
(Id.) 
Officer Jack Wade was dispatched to investigate. (2/10/2011 Tr., p.7, L.7 
- p.8, L.19; Exhibit 1, Track 2.) When Officer Wade arrived at Walgreens, he 
saw a blue Camaro with an elderly male driver starting to exit the Walgreens' 
parking lot. (2/10/2011 Tr., p.8, Ls.17-25.) Officer Wade activated his overhead 
lights and stopped in front of the Camaro. (2/10/2011 Tr., p.9, Ls.6-9.) Officer 
Wade made contact with the driver who identified himself as Fifer and asked if 
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"he was okay and if he needed any medical assistance," explaining that dispatch 
had received a call from someone who was concerned for his well-being. 
(2/10/2011 Tr., p.10, Ls.2-18.) Fifer "advised that he was okay but as he did 
speak," Officer Wade "could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from 
the vehicle." (2/10/2011 Tr., p.10, Ls.20-22.) When asked about the odor of 
alcohol, Fifer admitted he had been drinking. (2/10/2011 Tr., p.10, L.23 - p.11, 
L.1.) Officer Wade subsequently arrested Fifer for driving under the influence 
and a breath analysis revealed Fifer's blood alcohol content was .182/.173. 
(2/10/2011 Tr., p.12, Ls.15-23; R, p.21.) The state charged Fifer with driving 
under the influence, second offense. (R, pp.7, 17-18,20-21.) 
Fifer filed a motion to suppress, arguing: 
At the time of [his] seizure, Officer Wade's suspicion was based 
upon a caller identified only as Becki, indicating a belief that an 
elderly man in a blue Camaro seemed intoxicated and was acting 
confused. There was no further information provided that would 
distinguish the caller as anything other than an anonymous caller 
named Becki. There was no artiCUlated facts as to what the elderly 
man in the blue Camaro had done to cause the caller to believe the 
man was intoxicated. It was only indicated that the man had 
declined the caller's offer of help. Upon arrival, Officer Wade did 
not observe the blue Camaro engaged in any illegal activity or 
anything that might appear to be suspicion of illegal activity. 
(R, pp.11-12 (verbatim).) According to Fifer, because Officer Wade "lacked any 
facts from which the caller's identity, described only as 'Becki,' [sic] could be 
readily ascertained at the time he effectuated the traffic stop," and because 
Officer Wade stopped Fifer based solely on Becky's report, there was no 
"reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify the stop" 
2 
and all evidence obtained after the stop should be excluded as "fruit of the 
unlawful seizure." (R., pp.12-13.) 
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, Fifer acknowledged Becky 
was not an anonymous caller, and argued instead that because Becky thought 
Fifer was confused rather than intoxicated, Officer Wade had no basis to stop 
him. (2/10/2011 Tr., p.14, L.17 - p.16, L.8.) Fifer also argued that Officer Wade 
could not stop him under the community caretaker function because he had 
already declined assistance from Becky. (2/10/2011 Tr., p.16, Ls.9-14.) The 
magistrate denied Fifer's motion. (2/10/2011 Tr., p.26, L.11 - p.38, L.2.) Fifer 
thereafter pled guilty and the magistrate entered judgment. (R., pp.24, 28.) 
Fifer filed a timely notice of appeal to the district court (R., pp.29-32), and 
the district court affirmed (R., pp.42-43). Fifer timely appealed to this Court. (R., 
pp.45-47.) 1 
1 Execution of Fifer's judgment has been suspended pending appeal. (R., pp.38-
39,48-53.) 
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ISSUES 
Fifer states the issues on appeal as: 
1) Whether Appellant was seized for Fourth Amendment 
scrutiny? 
2) Whether the warrantless seizure was lawful under the 
caretaker function exception to the warrant requirement? 
3) Whether law enforcement had reasonable articulable 
suspicion a crime was being committed to effectuate a traffic stop? 
(Brief of Appellant, p.2.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Should this Court decline to consider Fifer's argument on appeal as the 
record does not indicate he preserved this issue for appeal by entering a 
conditional guilty plea? Alternatively, has Fifer failed to establish the district court 
erred in affirming the magistrate's denial of Fifer's suppression motion? 
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ARGUMENT 
This Court Should Decline To Consider Fifer's Claim On Appeal Because The 
Record Does Not Reflect He Entered A Conditional Guilty Plea, Reserving His 
Right To Appeal The Denial Of His Suppression Motion; Alternatively, Fifer Has 
Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Affirming The Magistrate's Denial 
Of Fifer's Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
Fifer asserts error in the denial of his suppression motion, arguing his 
detention was improper under the community caretaking function and, 
alternatively, there was no evidence of "criminal behavior" justifying the stop. 
(Brief of Appellant, pp.2-6.) The Court should decline to consider Fifer's 
argument because Fifer waived any right he may have had to appeal the denial 
of his suppression motion when he entered what appears from the record to be 
an unconditional plea of guilty to driving under the influence. Even if Fifer can 
produce evidence that he reserved his right to appeal the denial of his 
suppression motion, application of the relevant legal principles to the facts shows 
the district court correctly affirmed the magistrate's order denying Fifer's 
suppression motion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709,711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008». The 
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
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and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." kl 
"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if 
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure." kl (citing Losser, 145 
Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 
(1981)).2 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. 
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494,496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). 
C. This Court Should Decline To Consider Fifer's Claim On Appeal Because 
It Was Not Preserved By A Conditional Guilty Plea 
It is well-settled that "[a] valid plea of guilty, voluntarily and 
understandingly given, waives all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, 
whether constitutional or statutory, in prior proceedings." State v. Ak-Kotrani, 
141 Idaho 66, 69, 106 P.3d 392, 395 (2005) (quoting Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 
827, 832, 452 P.2d 54, 59 (1969)). However, a defendant may preserve such 
defects or issues by entering a conditional plea of guilty which reserves, in 
writing, the right to review any specified adverse ruling. AI-Kotrani, 141 Idaho at 
69, 106 P.3d at 395 (citing LC.R. 11(a)(2)). There is no evidence in the record 
2 Fifer cites an outdated standard of review applicable to review of an appellate 
decision by a district court. (Brief of Appellant, p.2 (citing State v. Pick, 124 
Idaho 601 (Ct. App. 1993).) The Idaho Supreme Court clarified the correct 
standard in Losser, supra, as set forth above. 
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that Fifer entered a conditional guilty plea as allowed by Rule 11. The change of 
plea form only indicates Fifer entered a plea of guilty, which was accepted by the 
magistrate. (R., p.24 (attached hereto as Appendix A).) There is no other written 
document in the record, nor any transcript, indicating Fifer's plea was conditional 
or specifying that he reserved his right to challenge the denial of his suppression 
motion. Based upon the record before this Court, Fifer's plea can only be 
deemed conditional by assumption, which is contrary to the "in writing" 
requirement of Rule 11 (a)(2) and contrary to appellate practice generally. 
Accordingly, this Court should decline to consider Fifer's claim of error. 
D. Even If Fifer Can Prove That He Reserved His Right To Challenge The 
Denial Of His Suppression Motion By Entering A Conditional Guilty Plea, 
He Has Failed To Demonstrate Error In The Denial Of His Suppression 
Motion 
Fifer asserts error in the denial of his suppression motion, arguing his 
detention was unsupported by either the community caretaking function or 
reasonable articulable suspicion. (Brief of Appellant, pp.2-6.) Fifer is incorrect. 
Fifer's detention was justified based upon the information Becky provided to 
dispatch, which provided Officer Wade reason to believe that Fifer may be in 
need of medical assistance, if not reasonable articulable suspicion to believe 
Fifer was driving under the influence. 
"[B]ecause the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
'reasonableness,' the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions." 
Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (citations omitted). The 
community caretaking function is one such exception and it involves the duty of 
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the police to help individuals that officers believe are in need of immediate 
assistance. State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho 752,754, 947 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1997) 
(citing In re Clayton, 113 Idaho 817, 748 P.2d 401(1988)). "Community 
caretaking is based on the notion that police serve to ensure the safety and 
welfare of the citizenry at-large." State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297, 304, 141 P.3d 
1166,1173 (Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted). "Among the core community 
caretaking activities are the responsibilities of police to search for missing 
persons, mediate disputes, aid the ill or injured, and provide emergency 
services." lsL at 302, 141 P.3d at 1171 (citation omitted). "In analyzing 
community caretaking function cases, Idaho courts have adopted a totality of the 
circumstances test." Wixom, 130 Idaho at 754, 947 P.2d at 1002 (citation 
omitted). "The constitutional standard in community caretaking function cases is 
whether intrusive action of police was reasonable in view of all surrounding 
circumstances." lsL, 130 Idaho at 754, 947 P.2d at 1002 (quoting State v. 
Waldie, 126 Idaho 864, 867, 893 P.2d 811, 814 (Ct. App. 1995)) (brackets 
omitted). Reasonableness is assessed based on the totality of the 
circumstances. lsL "The reasonableness of an officer's action in pursuit of 
community caretaking is to be "[t]ested upon practical considerations of everyday 
life on which reasonable persons act. ... " State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824, 
54 P.3d 464,467 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Matter of Clayton, 113 Idaho 817,818, 
748 P.2d 401, 402 (1988)). ''There must be a sufficient public interest furthered 
by the detention to outweigh the degree and nature of the intrusion upon the 
privacy of the detained citizen." Maddox, 137 Idaho at 824, 54 P.3d at 467. 
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(citation omitted). Further, "in order for the community caretaking function 
analysis to apply, an officer must possess a subjective believe that an individual 
is in need of immediate assistance, although the officer may harbor at least an 
expectation of detecting or finding evidence of a crime." State v. Deccio, 136 
Idaho 442, 445,34 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing cases). 
Application of the foregoing principles supports the district court's and 
magistrate's conclusion that Officer Wade acted well-within the scope of the 
community caretaking function. Officer Wade testified that he responded to 
Fifer's location after "Becky reported that this elderly male appeared to be 
confused and having possibly a medical condition." (2/10/2011 Tr., p.8, Ls.4-7.) 
Upon making contact with Fifer, Office Wade "asked him if he was okay and if he 
needed any medical assistance" and advised Fifer they "had received a call that 
he was having an issue and the lady who called was concerned for his well 
being." (2/10/2011 Tr., p.10, Ls.15-18.) Officer Wade's actions were reasonable 
and fell squarely within one of the "core community caretaking activities." Cutler, 
143 Idaho at 304,141 P.3d at 1173; Clayton, 113 Idaho 817,748 P.2d 401, is 
analogous to the circumstances presented in this case. 
In Clayton, an officer "observed a vehicle in a parking lot adjacent to a bar" 
in the "early morning hours." ~ at 818, 748 P.2d at 402. The vehicle was 
running, with the headlights on, and a man, later identified as Clayton, was sitting 
in the driver's seat, slumped over the steering wheel. ~ The officer "decided to 
approach the vehicle to determine whether the person was in need of medical 
attention, asleep or intoxicated." ~ The officer "opened the driver's side door, 
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reached in, turned the motor off, and took possession of the keys." 1.9.:. After 
several attempts at arousing Clayton, "Clayton awoke and began talking," but 
was incoherent. 1.9.:. Ultimately, the officer arrested Clayton for driving under the 
influence. 1.9.:. 
On appeal, the Court considered whether the officer's "conduct in 
performing his investigation complied with Clayton's fourth amendment right to 
be from unreasonable searches and seizures." Clayton, 113 Idaho at 818, 748 
P.2d at 402. The Court concluded it did, "not[ing] that the officer acted 
reasonably in investigating the situation." 1.9.:. The Court stated: "When [the 
officer] observed the vehicle with its motor running, lights on, and the driver 
slumped forward, he had a duty as a police officer to investigate as stated in 
Cody v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,441,93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 
(1973)." Clayton, 113 Idaho at 818, 748 P.2d at 402. "Tested upon practical 
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable persons act, th[e] situation 
[confronting the officer fell] outside the boundaries of normal conduct." 1.9.:. "The 
driver could have been hurt or sick, and in need of medical attention. [The 
officer] acted prudently and satisfied his caretaking function when investigating 
[Clayton's] vehicle." 1.9.:. 
Cutler also provides an analogous factual scenario. In Cutler, an officer 
was dispatched to a parking lot where a man was found incoherent and seated in 
the driver's seat of his car, which was parked haphazardly in front of a closed 
store. 143 Idaho at 300, 141 P.3d at 1169. Medical personnel were already 
there when the officer arrived and reported that although "Cutler was extremely 
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lethargic," he "did not appear to need medical assistance." .!sL The officer 
nevertheless remained on scene and, after "the medical personnel moved away 
from Cutler's vehicle, the officer observed a handgun on the ledge between the 
driver's seat and the doorsill." ~ The officer removed the gun, determined it 
was unloaded, and removed Cutler from the vehicle and placed him in handcuffs 
for "safety purposes." ~ A subsequent frisk for additional weapons uncovered 
two pocket knives and a loaded magazine for the gun. .!sL The officer then 
searched Cutler's car for additional weapons whereupon he found 
methamphetamine and paraphernalia . .!sL 
Cutler complained that his detention violated the Fourth Amendment. 
Cutler, 143 Idaho at 301, 141 P.3d at 1170. The Court of Appeals disagreed, 
concluding the officer's actions were reasonable and justified as part of the 
officer's community caretaking function. The Court reasoned: 
The officer's testimony established that he was motivated by 
his genuine concern for Cutler's welfare. Following the frisk of 
Cutler for weapons, the officer knew that, in addition to the 
handgun, Cutler possessed its ammunition and two pocket knives. 
In light of Cutler's condition, it was reasonable for the officer to 
believe that it may have been unsafe to leave Cutler in control of a 
vehicle, a handgun with ammunition, and two knives. Further, 
Cutler's privacy interest had already been compromised to the 
extent of the emergency medical personnel's intrusion. That 
intrusion was minimally exceeded by the officer's decision to remain 
at the scene and ascertain whether further assistance was needed. 
Therefore, the public interest in preventing the type of harm that 
could result from improper handling of a motor vehicle or firearm 
justified a brief detention to ascertain whether Cutler needed 
transportation, was gravely disabled due to mental illness, 
presented a danger to himself or others, or simply needed to rest. 
Cutler, 143 Idaho at 303, 141 P.3d at 1172 
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As in Clayton and Cutler, it was entirely appropriate for Officer Wade to 
detain Fifer for the purpose of determining whether he required medical aid or 
assistance in arranging for an alternative mode of transportation. As the 
magistrate noted, the community caretaking function did not require Officer Wade 
to allow Fifer to drive away despite his reported impairment and wait to see if he 
had a suspicious driving pattern, or even an accident. (2/10/2011 Tr., p.35, L.23 
- p.36, L.4.) See,~, Brigham City, 547 U.S. 398, 401 (206) ("it would serve no 
purpose to require [the officers] to stand dumbly at the door awaiting a response 
while those within brawled on, oblivious to their presence"). Indeed, if that were 
the case, the community caretaking would be irrelevant because the officer 
WOUld, at that point, have reasonable articulable suspicion if not probable cause 
to detain Fifer. Thus, the district court correctly agreed with the magistrate's 
conclusion that suppression was not required. (12/14/2011 Tr., p.36, Ls.11-19.) 
Although not entirely clear, it appears Fifer is asserting that the community 
caretaking function does not apply because there was no "emergency." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-6.) In support, Fifer argues: "Although the caller 
indicated the driver seemed confused and commented she hoped he was not 
having a stroke, it clearly did not rise to the level of an emergency" because 
"[n]either the caller's tone nor her own actions evidenced a belief that this was an 
emergency." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) At best, Fifer argues, Becky's call was "a 
request for a welfare check on a person parked in their [sic] car and not an 
emergency requiring law enforcement to seize the person and prevent them [sic] 
from driving." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) This argument is flawed both legally and 
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factually. Legally, the community caretaking function does not require an 
"emergency" before a detention is justified. As previously noted, "the core 
community caretaking activities are the responsibilities of police to search for 
missing persons, mediate disputes, aid the ill or injured, and provide emergency 
services." Cutler, 143 Idaho at 302, 141 P.3d at 1171. The emergency aid 
doctrine is just one aspect encompassed within the community caretaking 
function, not a necessary prerequisite to application of the community caretaking 
rationale to a given set of facts. See State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 295, 62 
P.3d 214, 219 (2003) (noting that Idaho "treats the emergency aid doctrine within 
the community care-taking function exception"). 
Fifer's claim also fails as a factual matter. Becky's act of calling 911 
certainly suggests she viewed something about the situation as emergent. 
Regardless, whether Becky viewed the situation as an "emergency" or just one 
appropriate for intervention for the purpose of checking on Fifer's welfare, Officer 
Wade's response was constitutionally permissible. 
Fifer also argues that, aside from the allegedly improper application of the 
community caretaking function in the denial of his suppression motion, the 
magistrate also erred in finding reasonable articulable suspicion to justify Fifer's 
detention.3 (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Although the state submits that this Court 
need not address the finding of reasonable articulable suspicion given the correct 
application of the community caretaking function, Fifer is incorrect in his assertion 
3 The district court did not address this basis for the stop, stating a preference for 
"focus[ing] on the community caretaking function" because, in the district court's 
view, "it's a little clearer ... whether there was a justification." (12/14/2011 Tr., 
p.33, Ls.8-18.) 
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that the information provided to Officer Wade was insufficient to justify a 
detention to confirm or dispel whether Fifer was an impaired driver. 
It is well-settled that the stop of a vehicle constitutes an investigative 
detention subject to Fourth Amendment requirements and is "analyzed under the 
principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 
(1968)." State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490,496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citations omitted). Under Terry, an investigative detention must be 
supported by reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is underway. 
State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 896, 821 P.2d 949, 951 (1991). The 
"reasonable suspicion" standard is an objective test that is satisfied if law 
enforcement can articulate specific facts which, along with the reasonable 
inferences from those facts, justify the suspicion that the person detained is or 
has been involved in criminal activity. State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 408, 
973 P.2d 758, 760 (Ct. App. 1999). Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding 
standard than probable cause. Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896, 821 P.2d at 951. 
Whether the officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to detain a citizen is 
determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances. State v. Van Dorne, 
139 Idaho 961, 964, 88 P.3d 780, 783 (Ct. App. 2004). Although a series of facts 
may appear innocent when viewed separately, they may warrant further 
investigation when viewed together. State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 917, 42 
P.3d 706,710 (Ct. App. 2001). 
Becky initially advised dispatch that Fifer may be driving under the 
influence, and she identified specific actions she observed that would be 
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consistent with that impression. (Exhibit, Track 1.) This information provided 
reasonable articulable suspicion that Fifer may be driving under the influence. 
Fifer claims otherwise relying on Becky's later statement during the 911 call that 
she did not think he was intoxicated, but maybe just confused. (Exhibit, Track 1.) 
Becky's "conclusion" did not, however, require Officer Wade to reject the 
possibility that Fifer was driving under the influence. Further, even if there was a 
lack of reasonable suspicion of intoxication, Becky's report of Fifer's confusion 
gave Officer Wade reasonable articulable suspicion to believe Fifer was driving in 
an inattentive manner due to some other condition. A brief detention to confirm 
or dispel any suspicion regarding Fifer's reported inability to drive was 
constitutional. 
Fifer has failed to demonstrate Officer Wade acted unreasonably in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment by detaining him to ascertain whether he 
needed assistance or, alternatively, whether he was too impaired to drive. Fifer 
has therefore failed to demonstrate error in the district court's decision affirming 
the magistrate's denial of his motion to suppress. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because there is no indication Fifer entered a conditional guilty plea 
reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion, this Court 
should decline to consider Fifer's claim on appeal. Alternatively, Fifer has failed 
to show error in the district court's decision affirming the magistrate's denial of his 
motion to suppress. 
DATED this 18th day of September, 2012. 
JES 
Dep Attorney General 
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APPENDIX A 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
-vs-
WILLIAM FIFER 
o True Name 
Corrected Name: 
APPEARANCES: 
I:8l Defendant 
• • THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHANGE OF PLEA 
) Case No. CR-2010-32901-C 
Plaintiff ) 
) Date: 3/21/2011 
) 
Defendant. ) Judge: NAFTZ 
) 
) Recording: MAG 5 (1:14-1:24) 
) 
[8J Defendant's Attorney Matthew Roker 
o Other 
I:8l Prosecutor Elizabeth Allen 
o Interpreter 
PROCEEDINGS: 0 THE STATE [8J DEFENSE COUNSEL ADVISED 
[8J Defendant to plead guilty to the charges set forth in the Complaint in case number( s) CR-201 0-32901-C. 
o charges to be amended as follows: __ 
o Defendant to plead guilty to amended charges. 
o State will move to dismiss . 
o Charge to be amended to ==- if defendant returns to Sentencing with proof of __ ,
U Standard First Offense Recommendation 
U Credit Time Served __ 
THE COURT ORDERED CHARGES 
o amended as set forth in case(s) __ . 
o dismissed. 0 to be dIsmissed at sentencing in case(s) __ . 
THE COURT DETERMINED DEFENDANT 
o waived appearance and counsel was authorized to plead in Defendant's behalf. 
[8J was entering the plea freely and voluntarily and understood the consequences of pleading gUilty. 
[8J understood the Court was not a party to, nor bound by, the plea negotiations. 
[8J PL OF GUlL TV entered by Defendant to Driving Under the Influence 2nd Offense l:8J accepted, 
Alcohol evaluation ordered. 0 Drug evaluation ordered. 0 Domestic Battery eval. ordered. 
l:8J Misdemeanor PSI 0 Anger Evaluation ordered 
[8JSENTENCING SET: April 14, 2011 at 1:30 pm before Judge Schiller. 
CUSTODY: 
o Released on written citation promise to appear, 
o Released on own recognizance. (O.R.) 
o Released to pre-trial release officer. 
[8J Released on bond previously posted, 
o Remanded to the custody of the sheriff. 
o Bail set at $_. 
OTHER: __ . 
Cf!J/JJ1Am 0 -~-----H---+-t_---J' Deputy Clerk 
CHANGE OF PLEA 000024 0612010 
